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Abstract: The distributive politics literature following Weingast (1979) predicts 
majoritarian redistribution within strong party systems.  This prediction is tested using 
evidence from Canadian job creation grant programs active during the mid-1990s.   
Results provide strong evidence against the hypothesis of majoritarian redistribution.   
Districts represented by the governing Liberal Party received lower grant allocations than 
did other districts, both absolutely and conditional on the unemployment variables on 
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1. Introduction
1 
In political systems characterized by strong party discipline, distributive politics should 
reward districts represented by members of the majority party at the expense of those 
represented by members of minority parties.  The strand of the distributive politics 
literature that follows Weingast in finding universalist norms (Weingast, 1979; Weingast, 
Shepsle and Johnson, 1981; Schwartz, 1994) carries with it the caveat found in Shepsle 
and Weingast (1981) that, in strong party systems, universalism should be expected 
among districts represented by the majority party
2, implying transfers from minority party 
districts to be distributed among majority party districts.  And, of course, the minimum 
winning coalition literature (Riker, 1962; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) is quite compatible 
with redistribution favoring districts held by the majority party in a strong party system; 
in such cases, the majority party forms the coalition.   
The Canadian political system is characterized by very strong party discipline.  Longley 
(1998) argues that party discipline in the Canadian parliament borders on absolute.   
Given an executive (the Cabinet) comprised of members of the largest party in the House 
of Commons and whose tenure depends on the maintenance of their party’s preeminent 
status in the Commons, Cabinet members will have a strong incentive to target 
                                                 
1 Eric Crampton is a doctoral candidate at George Mason University.  The author thanks Thomas 
Stratmann, Roger Congleton, Tyler Cowen, Bryan Caplan, Stephen Ferris, participants at George Mason 
University’s Brown Bag seminar and participants at the 2002 Public Choice Meetings for useful comments 
and suggestions.  The usual disclaimer applies.  The author thanks the Earhart Foundation, the Bradley 
Foundation, and the James Buchanan Center for financial support. 
2 Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that uncertainty over the composition of subsequent legislatures may 
lead to broad-based universalism even in strong party systems.  But, since nothing binds the Opposition 
Party to hold to universalism in future periods, nothing will compel the current governing party to engage 
in universalism in this model.   
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government programs to enhance the electoral success of MPs of their own party.  We 
should expect then not only that legislation will explicitly favor government-held 
districts, but also that any political discretion in the distribution of funds under the 
various federal programs will be used to the benefit of electoral districts held by the 
governing party.  This paper examines the distribution of Canadian job creation grants in 
the mid 1990s and finds very little evidence of transfers favoring majority-held districts.  
Indeed, the broad pattern indicates the exact opposite. 
The distribution of federal job creation grants has been a subject of much controversy in 
Canada.  Allegations of improprieties in the management of grants at Human Resources 
Development Canada (HRDC) led to an audit of HRDC grants and the publication of a 
rich data set including the date and value of grants awarded to each electoral district.  
While grants were to have been awarded to businesses in high unemployment areas of 
Canada, allegations of political interference in the distribution of grants have figured 
prominently on the front pages of Canadian newspapers in recent years.
3  While HRDC 
was to have formally decided which job creation projects would be allocated federal 
funds, a parallel approval process internal to the governing Liberal Party was found to be 
operating (Fife and Macintosh, 2000).  Opposition parties and the press argued that the 
grant programs amounted to little more than a means of buying votes for the Liberal 
Party (Macintosh, 2000b).  An audit of the HRDC grants by the Auditor General of 
                                                 
3 For example, see Andrew Macintosh, “Bloc Challenges Stewart to reveal recipient’s invoices”, National 
Post, May 4, 2000.  The article reports that a bankrupt company in the Prime Minister’s riding was awarded 
a job creation grant in 1998 though documents showed it was ineligible for the funds.  Internal HRDC 
emails claimed that the Prime Minister’s Office ordered them to do “everything legally possible” to get the 
grant to the bankrupt company, owned by a friend of the Prime Minister.   
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Canada (Auditor General, 2000) found gross improprieties in the management of the job 
grant programs and in the procedures used to determine grant distribution.  Consequently, 
the distribution of job grant funds through HRDC should prove a convincing test of 
whether discretion in pork barrel projects disproportionately favors districts held by the 
governing party.   
2. Background 
Canada is governed by a Westminsterian parliamentary system that has enjoyed a Liberal 
Party governing majority since 1993, when widespread popular disapproval of the 
governing Progressive Conservative Party and the breakdown of its regional coalition 
reduced it from a strong majority to two seats in the House of Commons.  The Liberal 
Party, drawing support mainly from Ontario and from the East in 1993, earned a narrow 
majority victory in 1997 despite losing many of its seats in the Maritime Provinces.  The 
Liberal Party earned a stronger majority in the general election of 2000.  As is the case in 
Westminsterian systems, the governing party in the Canadian House of Commons 
controls both the legislative and executive branches of government.  The Prime Minister 
forms a Cabinet, typically drawn from sitting MPs from his own party, to oversee the 
various and sundry departments of the federal government.  The Deputy Minister 
appointed in each department, whose tenure depends on the support of his Minister, 
controls the bureaucracy and implements policy objectives specified by the Minister.  
The Cabinet formed by the Prime Minister consequently enjoys a rather large degree of 
discretion in setting and implementing policy. 
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In response to changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act that would more severely 
affect residents of high unemployment regions of the country, the Liberal government 
initiated the Transitional Jobs Fund (TJF) in 1996.  During its three-year mandate, the 
TJF was to target three hundred million dollars toward private sector and community job 
creation in regions with unemployment in excess of twelve percent, some two percentage 
points higher than the national average.  Firms could seek federal funding through the 
TJF for projects that would create new, sustainable jobs by applying through their 
regional HRDC office.  HRDC requirements demanded that at least half of the funds 
necessary for the firm’s project come from the private sector or from other government 
departments.  The approval of the local Member of Parliament was also an important 
factor in determining an applicant’s success.  The Canada Jobs Fund (CJF) succeeded the 
TJF in 1999 with annual funding of $110 million targeting regions with unemployment 
exceeding ten percent.
4     
Individual Members of Parliament have a rather strong interest in assisting local firms in 
receiving job grants through either the TJF or the CJF.  In both cases, a role for the local 
Member of Parliament was explicitly written into the funding approval process, assisting 
the local MP in appropriating credit for the federal fund allocation.  As backbench and 
Opposition Members of Parliament can have little to no role in policy formation, 
“constituency service” functions become an important margin along which MPs can work 
to increase their visibility, public recognition, and chances of electoral success (Longley, 
                                                 
4 Average unemployment fell from 9.6 percent in 1996 to 7.6 percent in 1999. 
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1999).
5  Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that increased federal funding correlates with 
increased support for the incumbent in the subsequent election.  For government 
backbenchers, securing a job creation grant can help in showing constituents the benefits 
of being represented by a member of the governing party.
6  For Opposition members, a 
job grant can provide credible evidence of the MP’s effectiveness despite not being in the 
government.   
Had political factors mattered greatly in the distribution of Canadian job creation grants, 
we would expect the data to show either that Liberal-held districts were more likely to 
meet program unemployment thresholds or that those districts received preferential 
treatment within available slack in program administration.  Evidence of the former 
would include findings that Liberal districts, especially those won by narrow margins, 
were more likely to have unemployment levels in excess of the stated threshold.   
Evidence of the latter would be seen if, after correcting for the unemployment variables 
on which grant allocation decisions were statutorily required to have been made, electoral 
districts represented by a Liberal Member of Parliament were more likely to be allocated 
job creation programs, were allocated higher total dollar figures, or both. 
                                                 
5 Longley cites studies by Kornberg and Mishler (1976) and by Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1979, 1983, 
1987) showing the importance of constituency service to MPs.  While Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina explore 
the role of constituency service in Great Britain, tighter party discipline in Canada than in Great Britain 
would tend to magnify their findings rather than diminish them in application to Canada. 
6 Indeed, Prime Minister Chretien announced to the House of Commons, in response to a question from 
Michel Gauthier (Bloc Quebecois MP) regarding federal infrastructure spending in Quebec, that “For 25 
years, the people of Lac-St.-Jean and Chicoutimi were promised roads by the former Jonquière MP [Lucien 
Bouchard, former head of the Bloc Quebecois].  Now that they have a Liberal MP, they have hope.”  See 
Wells (2002). 
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Given the Canadian political structure and given the job grant approval process set by 
Cabinet and by HRDC guidelines, we would expect political involvement in TJF/CJF 
along several fronts.   
First, all Members of Parliament would be expected to lobby strongly for proposed 
projects in their districts, especially if they were elected by narrow margins in the 
previous election and expected to run in the next election.  Levitt and Snyder (1997) find 
that a hundred-dollar increase in per capita federal spending in a district corresponds to a 
two percent increase in incumbent vote share in the subsequent election.  We would then 
expect the data to reveal higher grant allocations awarded to districts represented by 
Members seeking re-election in the forthcoming election and to districts won by narrow 
margins of victory.   
If the predictions of the distributive politics literature hold, we should expect that districts 
represented by the governing Liberals would be more likely to be eligible for HRDC 
funding.  If press reports of a parallel Liberal Party grant approval process (Macintosh, 
2000b) outside of the HRDC approval channels were true, a direct seat maximization 
motive on the part of the Liberals would lead us to expect the data to reveal that Liberal 
MPs were more successful in garnering job creation grants, especially in districts won by 
narrow margins.  Additionally, if political slack sufficient for the exercise of broad 
discretionary power by the Liberals had existed, we would also expect higher allocations 
to firms making larger campaign contributions to the Liberal Party.  While the data to 
examine this final claim directly is not available, we could expect that this form of 
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distortion would also be revealed in higher allocations to Liberal ridings.  Large corporate 
donations to the Liberal Party could be expected to be rewarded through grants to branch 
offices or subsidiaries; if discretion were available, grants would be made to local offices 
in Liberal districts.  And, the rewarding of donations to local candidates would be 
expected to be more heavily concentrated in Liberal districts.  While the lack of data 
linking contributors to grants prevents us from affirming the existence of distortionary 
distribution to contributors, the finding of no distortionary distribution to Liberal ridings 
might cast some doubt on allegations of this form of impropriety.   
In sum, had political influence played as large a role as claimed by the press, and as the 
distributive politics literature would predict, in determining the allocation of job creation 
funds, we should expect the data to reveal either or both of two patterns.  First, Liberal 
districts should have been more likely to be eligible for funds and, consequently, to have 
then received higher allocations than other districts.  Second, the data should reveal that, 
correcting for unemployment, incumbent status, margin of victory and interaction effects, 
Liberal Members of Parliament either had a significantly higher probability of winning 
job creation grant funds, won higher total dollar allocations, or both.   
3.  The Data 
The job creation grant scandal prompted the release of a wealth of data on the distribution 
of job grants administered by Human Resources Development Canada.  Data sorted by 
the electoral district of the sponsoring Member of Parliament is available for HRDC 
spending through the Transitional Jobs Fund (TJF), which ran from July 1996 through 
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March 1999, and through the Canada Jobs Fund (CJF), which began when the TJF 
expired and ended in June of 2000.  
As time-series data on unemployment by electoral district is not collected by Statistics 
Canada, estimates were constructed based on the unemployment data by economic region 
reported by Statistics Canada.
7  As economic regions are generally larger than electoral 
districts, most districts fall into a single economic region.  When a district overlapped 
multiple economic regions, the figures corresponding to the region with the higher level 
of unemployment were taken.  The monthly data were then grouped into semi-annual 
observations.  The variable threshold was constructed to indicate whether the maximum 
unemployment rate in the economic region corresponding to the electoral district met the 
threshold level of the program in the six month period before, during, or following a half-
year observation.  The average value of this variable over an electoral period was then 
taken.  The variable unemploy  was constructed to indicate the amount by which 
unemployment exceeded the threshold levels, with negative values indicating that levels 
did not meet the threshold.  This variable was used rather than a simple unemployment 
measure because the target unemployment rate changed over the time period.  We would 
expect this variable to be positive and significant not only because it reflects underlying 
constituent demand for programs, but also because it may be taken into account by 
HRDC in funding allocation decisions.   
                                                 
7 Districts were mapped onto economic regions by examining maps of both types of region provided by 
Elections Canada and by Statistics Canada.  There were, on average, 3.6 electoral districts per employment 
district (median= 2.8, standard deviation= 2.3). 
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A potential problem in all CJF and TJF data is that, while funds allocated through HRDC 
are listed, a separate category exists for other funds tied to the specific job creation 
program.  While this might be assumed to consist of industry matching funds, it is 
possible that the additional funds come from other departments of the federal 
government.  If significant portions of funding of projects come from other parts of the 
federal government, and if these funds are not distributed evenly with HRDC projects, 
bias is likely in the following results.  Specifically, if the workings of distributive politics 
played out in the allocation of matching funds from other parts of the government rather 
than in the allocation of funds through the TJC/CJF programs, any such effects will not 
be found through analysis of this dataset.  A richer data set than is available would be 
necessary for the correction of this problem.
8   
Job grant allocations per district were totaled for the periods prior to and following the 
1997 Canadian General Election, resulting in two observations per electoral district.
9  The 
maximum value of the variable unemploy and the average value of the variable threshold 
                                                 
8 An HRDC background paper on the Transitional Jobs Fund notes that HRDC funds made up 14% of total 
project spending, other federal spending made up an additional 10%, provincial and municipal government 
contributions totaled 33% of spending, and private sector contributions made up 39% of spending.   
Fundraising and donations comprised the remaining 4%.   
9 A complication exists in a redistricting that occurred prior to the 1997 general election.  The total number 
of seats in the House of Commons expanded from 295 to 301.  Demographic and economic data for post-
1997 ridings were mapped onto pre-1997 ridings by examining which post-1997 district the pre-1997 
district mapped onto, usually by following which ridings incumbent MPs chose to run in for the 1997 
election.  Mappings made available online by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation allowed imputed 
margins of victory from the 1993 election to be calculated.   
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in each of the two observation periods were used.
10  Summary statistics are provided in 
Table 1, in the appendix. 
4. Analysis 
In Table 1, column 1, we see that 30% of Liberal districts meet the HRDC threshold 
levels for program allocation,
11 significantly less than the proportion of Opposition 
districts meeting the threshold.  Thirty-nine percent of all other districts met the 
threshold, significantly greater than the Liberal’s 30% in a one-tailed test (t=2.22).   
Restricting the sample to those districts won by less than 5% of the popular vote, 
equivalence of means cannot be rejected.  We can then reject the hypothesis that the 
program included any legislative bias in favor of Liberal districts.  Distributive politics 
predictions of redistribution favoring Liberal districts would then need to be fulfilled 
through the actual administration of the program. 
The summary statistics presented in Table 1 provide no evidence of preferential treatment 
of Liberal-held districts.  While 28% of Liberal districts receive program allocations, 
44% of Opposition-held districts receive funding; the difference is significant at any 
normal level (t=4.16).  The ratio of districts receiving allocations to districts qualifying 
                                                 
10 As the meeting of threshold unemployment levels was a statutorily-necessary precondition for grant 
allocations, it would be expected that applicants would pick the highest possible unemployment level in 
making their application.  As then expected, regressions using maximum-unemployment figures yielded 
better fits than those using average-unemployment figures, and maximum-unemployment was adopted for 
general use in the paper. 
11 The reported figure is the average value of threshold for each party.  Of course, though some electoral 
districts meet the HRDC guideline during the entire period and others never meet the guideline, some 
districts meet the guideline only part of the time.  Some 11% of districts meet threshold only part of the 
time; the fraction of the time period in which those districts met the threshold is used for those districts.  
Additionally, the threshold standard is only a proxy for meeting HRDC guidelines as local unemployment 
levels may diverge from regional unemployment data. 
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for allocations should reflect any gross improprieties in funding decisions.  If a higher 
proportion of eligible Liberal districts in fact received funding, we would have reason to 
suspect that available slack in program administration was used to the benefit of the 
Liberals.  However, no such evidence is found in the summary statistics.  If anything, the 
statistics suggest a bias against Liberal-held districts.  Where the ratio of districts 
receiving funding to districts eligible for funding stands at 0.9 for the Liberal Party, the 
comparable ratios for the Opposition parties are 2.27 for the Canadian Alliance, 0.87 for 
the Bloc Quebecois, 1.18 for the Progressive Conservatives and 2.0 for the NDP.  On the 
whole, Liberal districts seem less likely than other districts to receive funding.   
Other simple tests on the summary statistics failed to reveal any bias favoring Liberal-
held districts.  A measure was constructed to indicate whether a district received funding 
when it failed to meet the threshold level of unemployment.  Liberal districts are less 
likely than others to receive program allocations when threshold unemployment levels 
fail to be met, and the difference is significant at the 1% level.  When the sample is 
restricted to those districts receiving grant allocations, Liberal districts receive slightly 
less money than other districts, though the difference is not statistically significant.  Over 
the set of all districts, Liberal districts receive an average of $278,000 less than other 
districts in an electoral period; the difference is significant at the one percent level. 
When observations are sorted by region and by party, it remains difficult to discern a 
pattern favouring the Liberals.  Some three percent of western Liberal districts meet the 
unemployment threshold, while 21% of western Liberal districts are allocated funding.  
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However, similar proportions of Canadian Alliance and Liberal districts receive program 
allocations when the unemployment threshold is not met.  Compared to other Liberal 
districts, a higher proportion of western districts were won by a narrow margin in the 
previous election and a higher proportion of western districts receive funding when the 
unemployment threshold is not met.  The ratio of districts receiving funding to districts 
eligible for funding is smaller in Quebec than that in any other region.  While opposition 
parties have frequently pointed out in the press that the St. Maurice district held by the 
Prime Minister has been allocated more funds than all of the western provinces 
combined, far fewer eligible Quebec ridings receive any money than do eligible western 
ridings.  Indeed, while the Prime Minister’s district received some $8.5 million in grants, 
the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta received a total of $15.2 
million.  While it could be argued that discrimination against western provinces was 
implicit in the unemployment thresholds established, a hypothesis of discrimination 
against the west in the actual administration of the program seems unlikely to be 
supported given these summary statistics.   
Tobit specifications were run to determine whether, correcting for the unemployment 
levels on which program allocation decisions were required to have been made, Liberal 
districts received higher allocations than other districts.
12  Approximately 65% of federal 
electoral districts were not allocated a TJF or CJF grant in an observation period.  Each 
district is accorded two observations: one covering the period prior to the mid-1997 
                                                 
12 Probit and OLS specifications were also run but revealed no substantial differences from Tobit 
specifications. 
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election, and one covering the period following the election.  Since evidence of 
distributive politics should affect which districts received any funds and the quantity of 
funds allocated to districts receiving funds, a Tobit model is most appropriate.  I estimate 
the following baseline specification using Tobit: 
Thousands of dollars allocated to a district during an electoral cycle = 
α + φ * (unemployment variables) + γ * (regional indicators) + ϕ * (political variables) 
+ β * (party identification variables and interactions) 
Results from national level specifications are reported in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Tobit specification.   
Dependent variable: $ thousands allocated to district during an electoral period. 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate  t P  Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate  t P 
            
threshold 2710.8  6.54  0.000  CA  713.3  1.05  0.293 
unemployment 128.2  3.14  0.002 
CA * 
Margin 0.3  0.01  0.989 
incumbent 619.6  1.72  0.086 NDP  376.5  0.45 0.660 
margin of victory  -21.2  2.16  0.031 
NDP * 
Margin 89.8  1.53  0.126 
east 1215.2  2.41  0.016  PC  1421.1  1.73  0.083 
west 437.3  0.84  0.400 
PC * 
Margin -2.6  0.05  0.960 
Quebec 577.0  1.29  0.199  BQ  1198.7  1.88  0.060 
Constant -2906.9  5.18  0.000 
BQ * 
Margin  -42.5 2.07  0.039 
N 595      Prob  >  χ
2  0.0000    
 
Several trends are apparent in these results.  First, the meeting and exceeding of target 
unemployment thresholds is the most important factor explaining the distribution of job 
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creation grants.  Evaluating all other variables at sample means, a district moving from 
sample mean unemployment below the threshold to meeting the threshold moves from a 
predicted negative allocation to a predicted allocation of $417,000.  A percentage point 
increase in unemployment above the threshold level corresponds with an increase in 
expected program allocations of $128,200.  Districts in eastern provinces received higher 
allocations than districts in all other parts of the country after correcting for 
unemployment.  Western and Quebec districts did not receive allocations significantly 
higher than those awarded to Ontario, the region omitted in the regression.  Standard 
political variables also prove important.  A Member of Parliament contesting the 
subsequent election brings home $619,600 more than a “lame duck” MP.  Similarly, MPs 
who won their districts by narrower margins brought home more money; every 
percentage point increase in the representative’s margin of victory decreases expected 
allocations by $21,200.   
The distributive politics literature predicts that districts represented by the governing 
Liberal Party, the omitted dummy variable in this regression, should receive more money 
than districts represented by other parties.  This would lead us to expect negative and 
significant coefficients on the indicator variables for each of the other parties (CA, NDP, 
PC and BQ).  This is not the case in the regression above.  The coefficients on each 
opposition party indicator are positive, and sometimes significantly positive.  We should 
also expect that allocations to opposition districts decrease as the opposition incumbent’s 
position becomes less secure.  The interaction of margin of victory with each opposition 
party indicator provides little evidence of this; the coefficient is only significant in 
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interaction with the Bloc Quebecois indicator, and there the sign is negative.  Narrowly-
won Bloc Quebecois districts were given more money under the job creation grant 
programs than were Liberal districts.   
As these results were contrary to expectations, several alternate specifications were 
tested.  In an alternative national specification where only a Liberal Party indicator is 
included rather than indicators for each opposition party, I find that Liberal districts 
receive $1,161,500 less than opposition districts, a difference significant at the 1% level.  
In that specification, narrowly-won Liberal districts received lower allocations than other 
Liberal districts; a percentage point decrease in the margin of victory corresponds to a 
$26,000 decrease in allocations and is significant at the 10% level.   
I tested the equivalence of Liberal and individual opposition party coefficients in a series 
of specifications
13 using the national sample and regional sub-samples.  In the national 
sample, Liberal districts were found to receive significantly lower allocations than Bloc 
Quebecois or Progressive Conservative districts.  In Quebec, Liberal districts received 
$1,361,000 less than Bloc districts.  While a percentage point decrease in Bloc margin of 
victory yielded a $63,000 increase in expected funding, a similar decrease in Liberal 
margin of victory corresponded only to a $13,000 increase in expected funding.  In the 
east, Liberal districts received $2,560,000 less than the Progressive Conservatives and 
$1,576,000 less than the NDP.  However, NDP allocations were increasing in margin of 
victory while those of the Liberals were decreasing in margin of victory.   
                                                 
13 Additionally, the interaction of party indicators with the incumbent variable was tested but proved 
insignificant in all specifications. 
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These results are strongly at odds with the distributive politics literature.  Another factor 
may be at play in Quebec: the separatist movement.  It may be that, in Quebec, job 
allocation grants are seen as a benefit of federalism in those districts where political 
support for separation, proxied rather well by political support for the officially separatist 
Bloc Quebecois, is tenuous.  However, one would then predict lower grant allocations in 
strong federalist and strong separatist districts (districts won either by the Liberals or by 
the Bloc with strong majorities), and higher grant allocations in marginal districts held by 
both parties.  The relatively weak absolute effect of margin of victory on grant allocations 
to Quebec Liberal districts would argue against that hypothesis.    
A cruder version of distributive politics may have been at play in Quebec, however.  
Regressions including an indicator variable for the district represented by the Prime 
Minister show that the Prime Minister’s district received allocations totaling some $3.5 
million more than would otherwise have been expected, a result significant at the 5% in 
all specifications run.  This result is consistent with findings of improprieties in the 
distribution of grant monies in the Prime Minister’s district; however, similar outliers can 
be found among other parties. 
Only in the West do the predictions of distributive politics bear fruit.  There, Liberal 
districts received $1,528,000 more than Canadian Alliance districts and $1,898,000 more 
than NDP districts.  And, grant allocations to western Liberal districts are far more 
heavily concentrated among narrowly-won districts.   
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4.  Conclusion and summary 
Standard theories of distributive politics lead us to expect redistribution favoring the 
majority party in a strong party system.  The distribution of grants under the Transitional 
Jobs Fund and Canada Jobs Fund administered by Human Resources Development 
Canada in the mid to late 1990s generated a great deal of controversy.  Allegations were 
laid that the fund existed mainly to bolster the re-election prospects of Liberal Members 
of Parliament, which would have been consistent with the expectations of the distributive 
politics literature.   
Analysis of the data yields several conclusions.  First, meeting the stated program 
unemployment threshold is the most significant factor explaining the distribution of job 
creation grants.  It is the most statistically significant variable and has the largest 
quantitative effect.  Unemployment levels above the threshold level also yield increased 
grant allocations.  Second, normal political variables are important.  Representatives 
elected by slim margins of victory work harder to get grants for their constituents 
because, as Levitt and Snyder show, increased federal funding produces more votes for 
local representatives.  Similarly, representatives contesting the next election bring home 
more money than do lame ducks.   
Most importantly, however, I find little real evidence that the expected workings of 
distributive politics were here at play.  Overall, Liberal districts fared more poorly than 
did the districts of other parties.  While Liberal districts received higher allocations than 
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other districts in the west, this pattern was found nowhere else in the country and was not 
seen in the national sample.   
The HRDC job creation grant program provides data for much further study.  Most 
obviously, the effect on grant allocations of constituency representation by a cabinet 
minister can be tested.  De Figueiredo and Silverman (2001) find that members of 
Congressional appropriations committees are successful in acquiring larger earmarked 
allocations for universities in their districts; whether Canadian Members of Cabinet are 
similarly able to direct funds to their benefit remains an open question.   
A broader open question remains: why do we not see majoritarian redistribution?  While 
theory led us to expect that Liberal districts would receive larger program allocations 
than other districts, the evidence in this case points us to the opposite conclusion.  Few 
observers of the Canadian political scene would agree that the Liberal Party is not a 
highly effective vote-maximizing organization, its current leadership quarrels 
notwithstanding.  The reconciliation of vote-maximization with universalist patterns of 
federal spending in a strong party system remains a promising field for future research. 
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Table 1: Sorted Means and Standard Deviations 
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[2273] .  . 
889 
[1909] . 
Progressive Conservative (PC)            






0.82     
















[0.44]   
0.16   










17.26   











[2615] 0  0 
695    
[896] 
3373   
[2754] 
                                                 
14 Districts won by less than five percent of the vote in the previous election. 
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Table 1 (continued) 






program  West Ontario  Quebec East 
New Democratic Party (NDP)            






0.40     
[0.52] 
0.06 















0.50    
[0.53] 
0.28 








13.70    
[9.76] 
1.28 











[635]  . . 3135 
[3297] 
 
                                                 
15 Districts won by less than five percent of the vote in the previous election. 
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Data Sources  
 
Data on the Transitional Jobs Fund was found at: 
http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/reports/3_tjf.shtml  
 
Data on the Canada Jobs Fund was found at: 
http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/reports/cjf.pdf  
 
Data on election results was found at: 
   http://www.elections.ca 
 
Economic data on Canada (including unemployment) was found at: 
   http://www.statcan.ca 
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